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Abstract 
Years before his death, Romualdo Abulad made himself controversial, a controversy 
that was not so much on his positive contribution to philosophy as his apology for 
Duterte and his regime. In this paper, Abulad’s apology for Duterte will be discussed. 
The discussion will be framed from within Abulad’s concept of the post-Machiavelli. 
This concept was earlier developed by Abulad in a chapter of a book co-authored by 
Alfredo Co.1 I argue that his concept of the post-Machiavelli is based on a privileging of 
The Prince and a reading that is subtly anti-Machiavellian. I further argue that the ethics 
of the post-Machiavelli, one that is guided by the philosophical compass of 
postmodernism, provided the ideological support for Duterte and his regime as it is 
both obscurantist and empty. The ethics of the post-Machiavelli obscures the politics 
of the regime by way of the ethics of the good. In doing so it legitimizes the political 
via the ethical. Here, the coupling or intersection of the political and the ethical 
provided an ideological support of the former by way of the abstract resources of the 
latter. However, I assert that ethics and politics ought to be decoupled. The ethics of 
the post-Machiavelli is likewise empty. Such an emptiness allows, at least in the level 
of theory, a liberal openness and accommodation to virtually any version of (a future) 
order, including that of fascism. 
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1 Romualdo Abulad, “Post-Machiavelli,” in Two Filipino Thomasian Philosophers on 
Postmodernism (Manila: UST Publishing House, 2004), 94-102. 
 
 
 
 
78  R.A. Imbong 
 
 
 
Romualdo Abulad had written extensively on the subject of 
postmodernism.2 Not only is his depth and grasp of the subject matter 
remarkable but also his genius in tracing its origins and development from the 
most unexpected thinkers astonishing.3 For example, Abulad argued how 
Immanuel Kant and Thomas Aquinas possess the quality of postmodern 
thought. Abulad saw in the works of these thinkers the self-critical and self-
negating character of postmodernism. This remarkable scholarship, 
undoubtedly a sign of expertise, made Abulad an authority not only of 
postmodernism but also of philosophy itself. As his knowledge went beyond the 
confines of the postmodern tradition, he remarkably grasped and elaborated 
how postmodern breaks appeared in the philosophical thought of classical 
philosophers. 
      
In this paper, I will elaborate Abulad’s notion of the post-Machiavelli 
which is governed by the philosophical compass of postmodernity.4 In other 
words, it is still part of what he saw as postmodernism overcoming the limits of 
modernism. However, I will argue two points. First, Abulad’s post-Machiavelli is 
based on a simplistic interpretation of Machiavelli, one that is characterized by 
the privileging of The Prince and a reading that is subtly anti-Machiavellian. 
Second, the ethics derived from the post-Machiavelli laid the ideological basis 
for his apology of the Duterte regime and the atrocities committed under its 
rule. While Abulad’s dismissive position towards ideology portrayed 
postmodernism to be a thoroughly non-ideological paradigm, I will explain how 
                                                        
2 See Romualdo Abulad, “Filipino Postmodernity: Quo Vadis?,” Kritike, 13(2), (2019): 
37-59; Romualdo Abulad, “Kant and Postmodernism,” PHAVISMINDA Journal, 2, (1998): 32-
51; Romualdo Abulad, “Philosophy and Politics: Do they Mix?,” PHAVISMINDA Journal, 8 
(2009): 1-18; and Romualdo Abulad, “St. Thomas Aquinas and Postmodernism,” 
PHAVISMINDA Journal, 4, (2005): 8-18. 
3 Romualdo Abulad, “Kant and Postmodernism,” PHAVISMINDA Journal, 2, 32-51 and 
Abulad, “St. Thomas Aquinas and Postmodernism,” PHAVISMINDA Journal, 4, 8-18. 
4 Romualdo Abulad, “Post-Machiavelli,” 94-102. 
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the ethics of postmodernism in the post-Machiavelli is laden with the purest 
ideology. 
      
The paper will be divided into four parts. The first is a short introduction. 
The second section will briefly discuss Abulad’s reading of Machiavelli and a 
proper Machiavellian response toward it. The third section will elaborate 
Abulad’s notion of the post-Machiavelli and how through its ethics an 
ideological support for the Duterte regime was developed. The last section will 
advance a polemic against post-Machiavelli and Duterte by way of a 
Machiavellian politics. 
 
 
Abulad’s Naïve and Simplistic Machiavelli 
       
Abulad described Machiavelli as the “political par excellence.”5 In asking 
whether philosophy and politics would ever mix,6 Abulad made a detour to 
Machiavelli and contrasted the notions of politics as politico-ethical and politics 
as power,7 emphasizing how The Prince embodied the ideals of the former. Like 
Thrasymachus and Hobbes, Machiavelli viewed human existence as evil8 and 
favored what Abulad described as “the politics of the strong man.”9 For Abulad, 
this is power politics, i.e., the constancy on the part of the sovereign ruler to 
secure the republic from both external and internal destabilizers. To achieve 
this, the sovereign must unhesitatingly use two modes of fighting, “one in 
accordance with the laws, the other with force,” 10 as the exigencies of the 
                                                        
5 Abulad, “Philosophy and Politics: Do they Mix?,” 8 and 1. 
6 Ibid., 1-18. 
7 Ibid., 98 and 101. 
8 See for example Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Peter Bondanella (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 58: For one can generally say this about men: they are 
ungrateful, fickle, simulators and deceivers, avoiders of danger, and greedy for grain. 
9 Abulad, “Philosophy and Politics: Do They Mix?,” 9. 
10 Machiavelli, The Prince, 60. 
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situation demand. Referring to the constitutive role of war and violence to 
politics, Abulad emphasized how the sovereign “has to make use of both the 
carrot and the stick at appropriate times.”11 Abulad echoed how, for Levinas, 
war constitutes politics,12 a rather militaristic view that identifies the force of the 
gun as the definitive mark of politics. Abulad insisted how power politics – i.e., 
the political – is incompatible with philosophy.13 
      
For Abulad, the seeming contradiction of Machiavelli in the Discourses 
and The Prince – the former advocating for a republican or popular rule, the 
latter a princely or dictatorial order – is reconciled in the latter, when he 
explained that there are two modes of fighting, a principle of political 
expediency that Abulad often quoted in many of his works.14 According to 
Machiavelli, the prince must fight, on the one hand, according to laws, and on 
the other, according to force; the former proper to humans, the latter to 
beasts.15 And the prince in this regard must be guided by a principle that is half-
human and half-beast, equipped with the right intuition when to shift from a 
humanly disposition to a beastly one.16 For Abulad, “Machiavelli is correct that 
from the position of the Prince, there is a natural tendency to employ all the 
means within its power to keep himself to his post.”17 
      
Abulad approved of that type of politics which in the practical sense is 
organizational management. The latter is not so much the constancy of 
maintaining power politics as the exercise of methods of organizing society 
                                                        
11 Abulad, “Philosophy and Politics: Do They Mix?,” 3. 
12 Abulad, “Post-Machiavelli,” 97. 
13 For Abulad, “power is all that counts for a politician.” Abulad, “Philosophy and 
Politics: Do They Mix?,” 7. 
14 For example, in Ibid., 96-97; Romualdo Abulad, Philosophy and Politics: Do They 
Mix?,” 2-3; and Romualdo Abulad, “Martial Law and Religion,” Scientia: The International 
Journal on the Liberal Arts, 6(2), (December 2017): 49. 
15 Machiavelli, The Prince, 60. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Abulad, “Post-Machiavelli,” 96. 
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according to the dictates of morality. Abulad’s model philosopher here is not 
Machiavelli but Sun Tzu and rejected the former’s way as being “naïve and 
simplistic.”18 In praising the way of Sun Tzu, Abulad described the smart person 
as one who is not so much “who does whatever suits him, good or bad,” but 
“who is able to achieve his objectives without having to throw ethics 
overboard.”19 And Sun Tzu is, for Abulad, the typical thinker for this smart 
person, the warrior. It is in the model of the warrior’s organizational method 
that, for Abulad, politics mixes with philosophy. Here, ethics, rather than power 
politics, becomes the definitive mark of what counts as politics. 
      
Remaining faithful to his penchant for the ethical, Abulad distinguished 
how “politics is after the enemy’s head,” while management is on “having the 
work or mission done and victory achieved.”20 Abulad described the 
postmodern human existence as “a species of ethical humanity,” someone who 
is “not patterned after Machiavelli’s prince,” but of Rousseau’s and Kant’s 
general will and good will, respectively.21 Anchoring on the ethical and echoing 
Levinas who breaches Totality in favor of the Infinity,22 Abulad aims to overcome 
the theoretical limits of the Florentine political thinker through what he called 
the Post-Machiavelli.23 Here, one does not so much abandon Machiavelli as to 
transcend, master, and break him.24 
      
Abulad’s direction toward a post-Machiavelli is guided by the 
philosophical compass of postmodernism. What he saw in Machiavelli is a 
thoroughly modern thinker who, like Rene Descartes, sustained his political 
philosophy through the agency of the ego. Abulad insisted that the “ego or self 
                                                        
18 Ibid., 14. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Abulad, “Philosophy and Politics: Do They Mix?,” 14. 
21 Abulad, “Filipino Postmodernity: Quo Vadis?,” Kritike, 13(2): 50. 
22 Abulad, “Post-Machiavelli,” 95. 
23 Ibid., 97. 
24 Ibid. 
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is the same ground that sustains Machiavelli’s Prince, the rational for power 
politics and the meaning of the survival sought for by him who needs to secure 
himself by any means.”25 This modernist bent of politics ultimately and 
essentially serves the “self and defines itself topically in the context of 
modernity where Descartes’ cogito is king.”26 He concluded by way of remarking 
on the rational basis of modernity is, making a case for what was always dear to 
Abulad, postmodernism. 
      
Abulad’s post-Machiavelli is rather based on a certain privileging of The 
Prince and a reading that is subtly anti-Machiavellian. Concerning the privileging 
of The Prince27 Abulad placed more regard to the said work and deployed the 
seemingly absolutist position of the book in the portrayal of a kingly and 
egocentric ruler.28 This privileging glosses over the bulk of Machiavelli’s 
discourses on republicanism,29 popular rule, and virtue and stresses the 
exceptional form of rule that is supposed to be limited only at the foundational 
points of a republic. In the Discourses, Machiavelli showed a preference over a 
popular form of government than a princely or kingly one. Specifically, 
Machiavelli suggested a mixed form of government where a popular magistracy 
coexists alongside the senate and the consuls.30 Throughout the Discourses, 
                                                        
25 Ibid., 98. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Abulad, “Philosophy and Politics: Do They Mix?,” 7. 
28 Ibid., 98 and 100. 
29 Machiavelli’s republicanism is characterized not so much with unity as the disunion 
between a magistracy and the citizenry. At the heart of the republic is the conflictual relation 
between the ruler/s and the ruled without however liquidating such a conflict in favor of an 
absolutist rule. This is best captured by Machiavelli’s assertion that “the disunion of the plebs 
and the Roman senate made that republic free and powerful.” Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses 
on Livy, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1996), 16. 
30 Gabrielle Pedullà, Machiavelli in Tumult: The Discourses on Livy and the Origins of 
Political Conflictualism, trans. Patricia Gaborik and Richard Nybakken (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), 42 and Alissa Ardito, Machiavelli and the Modern State 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 155. 
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Machiavelli examined how the popular regimes or republics in the antiquity 
were founded, maintained, expanded, and defended. He noted that “cities in 
which peoples are princes make exceeding increases in a very brief time, and 
much greater than those that have always been made under a prince.”31 In this 
case, Machiavelli is referring to the popular regimes of ancient Rome and Athens 
after the former expelled the kings and the latter was freed from Pisistratus.32 
Machiavelli saw in the popular order of these civilizations the social rudder that 
brought their civilizations prosperity and greatness. Contrasting monarchy from 
a republic, he insisted that the “governments of peoples are better than those 
of princes.”33 And while the same vices or virtues could be identified in both the 
people and the prince, for Machiavelli, the people are wiser and more stable 
than the prince and “more virtue will always be seen in the people.”34 A number 
of scholars have also convincingly argued that Machiavelli was more of a 
proponent of populism or republicanism than of a government of a single 
ruler.35 
      
As Thomas Osborne explained, Machiavelli regarded the exceptional and 
the rule of force as only necessary in the beginning but something that could 
not be sustained ultimately. Hence, the exceptional is tied to “moments of 
political inception” but not of long term security.36 Further, this privileging of 
The Prince portrays the sovereign to be an end in itself or the general rule rather 
                                                        
31 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 118. 
32 Ibid., 11-12. 
33 Ibid., 12. 
34 Ibid., 115-118. 
35 See Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and the Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth 
Century Florence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); John McCormick, 
Machiavellian Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Mikael Hörnqvist, 
Machiavelli and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Sean McAleer, 
“Machiavelli: Prince or Republic – An Examination of the Theorist’s Two Most Famous 
Works,” The Corinthian, 17(9), (2016): 116-125. 
36 Thomas Osborne, “Machiavelli and the Liberalism of Fear,” History of the Human 
Sciences, 30(5), (2017): 77. 
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than a means to take advantage of social events or accidents to build a stronger 
republic and develop a better constitution. This portrayal of the exceptional as 
the general rule is not actually what Machiavelli had in mind, as will be 
elaborated subsequently.37 
      
Concerning Abulad’s anti-Machiavellian reading, such an interpretation is 
characterized by an insistent portrayal of Machiavelli as promoting tyranny, 
cruelty, and other nefarious means of rule to sustain and maintain an egocentric 
relation of power. While Abulad supposedly advanced a reading that is post-
Machiavelli, an interpretation that would somehow transcend Machiavelli, at 
the heart of his argument is the fundamental identification of Machiavelli with 
egocentric power politics.38 It is based on an interpretation of Machiavelli that 
confuses the tactical means to be the political ends themselves. While 
Machiavelli set provisions for a certain form of exceptional rule and the equally 
exceptional means to realize political ends, Machiavelli’s position is more 
nuanced39 and tricky,40 compared to how Abulad saw Machiavelli’s way as 
“naïve and simplistic.”41 For example, Machiavelli insisted that a single ruler is 
necessary but only within specific political conjunctures. These are conjunctures 
                                                        
37 Still other thinkers portrayed his works as having a satirical effect, warning the 
citizens of the potentials and dangers of absolutism. Jean-Jacques Rousseau commented that 
“whilst pretending to teach lessons to kings, he taught great lessons to people.” Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, trans. Victor Gourevitch 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 95. Benedict de Spinoza also hinted how on 
reading The Prince a “free multitude should beware of entrusting its well-being entirely to 
one person.” Benedcit de Spinoza, “Political Treatise,” in The Collected Works, vol. 2, trans. 
Edwin Curley (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016), 65-34. 
38 Abulad, “Philosophy and Politics: Do They Mix?,” 98 and 100. 
39 Thomas Osborne, for example, insisted how Machiavelli took a nuanced position 
concerning the problem of cruelty as a political tactic. See Osborne, “Machiavelli and the 
Liberalism of Fear,” History of the Human Sciences, 69, 74, and 76. 
40 Gabrielle Pedullà explained the method on how Machiavelli answered complex 
questions by likening it to the traditional method of double-entry bookkeeping of Florentine 
merchants that considered both gains and losses in every alternative. See Pedullà, Machiavelli 
in Tumult: The Discourses on Livy and the Origins of Political Conflictualism, 42. 
41 Abulad, “Post-Machiavelli,” 96. 
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of socio-political (re)ordering, that is, when the republic founds itself either in 
its moment of inception or during a process of social reform at its later 
existence. For Machiavelli, the general rule in every moment of foundation of a 
republic is that it could only be so well ordered if ruled by one individual and not 
the multitude of the people.42 The caveat of this supposed general rule is its 
reference to moments of foundation (again, whether in a republic’s beginning 
or a period of reform) so that most of the time it is ruled by many and not by 
one. Especially when the republic suffers from tumultuous situations or wars 
that threaten its unity and organization, or when drastic reforms have to be 
organized to respond to a crisis, the exceptional figure of a “prudent orderer of 
a republic” is presumed to restore order in the republic.43 For Machiavelli, “it 
would be necessary to turn [the republic] more toward a kingly state than 
toward a popular state so that the men who cannot be corrected by the laws 
because of their insolence should be checked in some mode by an almost kingly 
power.”44 Necessity compels the sovereign to shift from one form of rule to 
another. 
      
For Machiavelli, people are shown by necessity so that they should act.45 
McCormick argued that necessity “inspires people to greater deeds than does 
choice” and potentially dangerous events can improve and renovate a regime.46 
This reveals a popular dimension of the exceptional rule that comes along with 
it as the dictatorial rule within the conjunctures of the exceptional moment 
mobilizes the people towards social renewal. Here, Machiavelli’s portrayal of a 
dictatorship is far from being a thoroughly cruel rule of a singular dictator as it 
                                                        
42 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 29. 
43 Ibid., 29 and 51. 
44 Ibid., 49. Emphasis mine. 
45 Ibid., 10-11. 
46 John McCormick, “Addressing the Political Exception: Machiavelli’s ‘Accidents’ and 
the Mixed Regime,” American Political Science Review, 87(4), (1993): 893. 
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is “the partisan and conflictual dimension of republic life.”47 McCormick denied 
that only through an executive-centered political response could such a state of 
exception be managed. He argued that a mixed regime is the most effective 
remedy against disruptions, events, or disturbances.48 The mixed regime 
expresses the conflictual relationships in a political process that found a new 
order or regime. These tensions are specifically between that of the great 
(dictator) and the people.49 So while Machiavelli argued for the necessity of a 
princely or dictatorial rule, such could only be perfected when combined with 
popular initiatives and activities. Del Lucchese argued how Machiavelli’s dictator 
comes to be the “real moving and constituent force of power itself,” thus 
providing an illustration of the immanent coexistence between constituent and 
constituted power, or between the political and the legal.  Although such a 
necessity is by no means in keeping with the general rule, it does not fail to 
involve the people in the constitution of a new regime. In this way, the people’s 
will becomes an instrument to “understand, define, but also limit the 
constituent power in and through the constituted and formal mechanism of 
law.”50 Paradoxically, the dictator appears only to constitute that which later 
limits or overcomes itself. 
      
Abulad’s anti-Machiavellian reading also confused Machiavelli’s depiction 
of a skillful use of deception with traditional politics or trapo (or traditional 
politician) in the country.51 However, as Osborne suggested, such seemingly 
deceptive maneuvers are but tactics rather than forms of government 
                                                        
47 Del Lucchese, “Machiavelli and Constituent Power: The Revolutionary Foundation 
of Modern Political Thought,” European Journal of Political Theory, 7. 
48 McCormick, “Addressing the Political Exception: Machiavelli’s ‘Accidents’ and the 
Mixed Regime,” American Political Science Review, 888. 
49 Filippo Del Lucchese, “Machiavelli and Constituent Power: The Revolutionary 
Foundation of Modern Political Thought,” European Journal of Political Theory, 16(1), 
(2014):14. 
50 Ibid., 13. 
51 Abulad, “Martial Law and Religion,” 50. 
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themselves,52 means rather than ends. There is an unbridgeable distance 
between someone who only appears to be cruel and someone who really is 
cruel. And the trapo in the Philippines is not so much an appearance of 
corruption, incompetence, and cruelty as the reality of corruption, 
incompetence, and cruelty itself. No wonder why Abulad saw the late dictator 
Ferdinand Marcos as the epitome of Machiavellian politics.53 But such an 
identification of Machiavelli with a thoroughly ruthless and fascist ruler not only 
is a disservice to Machiavelli and his contributions but also constructs the wrong 
impression that the exceptional order (i.e. Martial Law) invoked by the tyrant 
was, after all, for the progress of the republic. Machiavelli never tolerated 
tyranny and even condemned Caesar, among many others, for being a tyrant.54 
 
 
Killing in the Name of the Good 
 
      Abulad’s post-Machiavelli is an instance of what he described as a 
postmodern ethics. Unlike the supposed Machiavellian, the postmodern human 
existence is still ethical, perhaps the ethical par excellence. This is so because 
his/her ethics is not a modernist one that, on the one hand, stands on the 
certainty of the ego and, on the other, trapped within some absolute and 
immutable moral concepts. The ethics of the post-Machiavelli is carried by the 
fluid and constant processes of overhauling and transvaluation to arrive not on 
a foundation but on foundationlessness itself.55 Rather than a grounding, such 
an ethics is governed by an (un)grounding, that is, the grounding in ungrounding 
itself. This ethics explodes the anthropocentric foundations of modernity and 
(un)grounds a Nietzschean morality that is “beyond good and evil and a religion 
                                                        
52 Osborne, “Machiavelli and the Liberalism of Fear,” 77-78. 
53 Abulad, “Martial Law and Religion,” 49. 
54 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 31-32.  
55 Abulad, “Post-Machiavelli,” 100. 
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meant for the religionless.”56 Without a foundation and a form, the postmodern 
ethics of the post-Machiavelli proceeds via negativa and deconstructs norms and 
moral systems that are taken for granted. This is why Abulad proclaimed that 
the new consciousness that defines a new ethics of the postmodern “is no 
longer caught up in the web of any one ideology or system.”57 The apparent 
metallic strength that is ideology simply melts into thin air, to borrow a Marx’s 
expression, when exposed to the negative and formless fire of postmodern 
critique and contingency. 
      
Perhaps the most controversial question a postmodern could raise today 
is the question why we should not kill.58 Abulad himself asked this. He mused 
where we got the “idea that it is an evil thing to kill another” and went on to 
assume that we have simply taken for granted that we should not kill.59 He 
insisted that the right to and sacredness of life had been presupposed – that is, 
taken for granted as if the presupposition itself is immune from critique or 
suspicion – by both the liberal democratic and Judeo-Christian traditions for 
centuries already.60 Yet from a postmodern perspective, this seemingly absolute 
and taken for granted presupposition needs to be subjected to the most 
thorough critique and transvaluation. Abulad challenged that contemporary 
times “demand that we keep our minds open and dare to rethink and review our 
revered values.”61 Abulad traced the theological basis of such an assumption to 
the Old Testament (Deuteronomy 5:17) and explicated how the New Testament 
“rewrote” the old and summarized it in one commandment: “love one another 
as I have loved you.”62 Love has become the “genuine measure of good” and, 
                                                        
56 Ibid. 
57 Romualdo Abulad, “Kant and Postmodernism,” 47. 
58 Abulad, “Martial Law and Religion,” 51. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Abulad, “Filipino Postmodernity: Quo Vadis?,” 52. 
62 Abulad, “Martial Law and Religion,” 51. 
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for Abulad, with love as the measure, “everything becomes possible.”63 Abulad 
likened the Christian notion of love with Immanuel Kant’s notion of the good 
will and the latter with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of the general will. For 
Abulad, “any act that flows from the good will is good” and that the general will 
“never errs.”64 He explained that the “general will, or the good will, comes from 
within us and is the source of all that is good.”65 Which means that, it is not so 
much the act as the (loving, good, or general) will that determines the morality 
of a course of action. This is why Abulad dismissed as a mistake “to consider 
killing as… absolutely wrong” especially if a good or general will is behind such 
an action.66 Extending Abulad’s explication, if for love or for a will that is general 
or good one has to kill, then he/she is morally justified or at least beyond moral 
reproach. 
      
But what gave unity to Abulad’s arguments is not so much the recourse 
to the Enlightenment philosophies of Kant or Rousseau as the turn to the 
Nietzschean transvaluation of values. While Raymun Festin saw the immediate 
introduction of Nietzsche shortly after the elaboration on Kant as where 
“Abulad’s train of reasoning skids and gets off the track,” such a Nietzschean 
turn illustrated what an ethics of the post-Machiavelli (and what a mind of a 
postmodern thinker) really is. For it is not so much the phenomenology of love 
or the metaphysics of the will as the nihilist strategy of Nietzsche that 
(un)grounds the ethics of the post-Machiavelli. The centerpiece of such a 
nihilism, the transvaluation of morals,67 (un)grounds the ethics of the post-
Machiavelli. Coming from a Nietzschean nihilist ethics, Abulad insinuated how 
“the meaning of ‘human rights’ might have changed overnight”68 and possibly 
                                                        
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 51. 
65 Ibid., 52. 
66 Ibid., 52. 
67 Ibid., 67. 
68 Abulad, “Martial Law and Religion,” 58. 
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muddled by the biases of both the “yellowtards”69 and the Church. Behind such 
a contention is a dangerous assumption that, on the one hand, the concept of 
the “human” which is behind the concept of rights, has changed and along with 
it the notion of human rights; on the other, the concept might have also been 
altered and excluded from its extension a portion of the population: the 
criminals. Such an assumption was openly admitted by Duterte himself who 
accused that criminals have no humanity,70 if only the concept could be 
theoretically altered as easily as postmodernism does on virtually every 
established socio-political or moral category. Abulad further maintained how, 
“Duterte’s perception of human rights is now ahead of ours,”71 thus making 
more urgent the need to have an open mind.  Here, Abulad not only placed 
Duterte in the same intellectual plane as Nietzsche who came too early to be 
misunderstood by the crowd, but also scoffed at the critical herd who he 
believes Duterte understands more than them understanding his perception.72 
      
Through his concept of the post-Machiavelli, Abulad knitted the problem 
of the drug war, its ruthless killings, and the entire Duterte regime within the 
ethical framework. From Abulad’s analysis of the Duterte regime, ethics has 
intersected the regions of politics. A closer reading of Abulad, however, would 
reveal that he considers ethics as an ideological support of the regime itself. 
Despite Abulad insisting on the non-ideological quality of postmodern ethics,73 
its purely ideological character becomes undeniably obvious vis-à-vis Abulad’s 
ethical justification of Duterte’s regime. What we have here is Zizek’s reading of 
the Hegelian coincidence of opposites, where the neutralization of an ethical 
                                                        
69 Referring to the political spectrum of the yellow liberal party. 
70 Leila Salaverria, “Duterte: Criminals Have no Humanity,” Inquirer.net, 02 March 
2017, retrieved from https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/876970/duterte-criminals-have-no-
humanity. 
71 Abulad, “Martial Law and Religion,” 58. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Abulad, “Kant and Postmodernism,” 47. 
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framework (purifying itself of its ideological contents) constitutes ideology par 
excellence.74 
 
The ethics of the post-Machiavelli obscures the violence of a regime and 
develops an apology that frames political violence from within the discourse of 
the ethics of the good. Abulad admitted that even God would have no “qualms 
about killing, if that would be tantamount to good.”75 Not that violence in itself 
is morally abhorrent and so has to be condemned. Rather, Abulad’s apology 
leaps from the political to the ethical and defends the former from the abstract 
resources of the latter. The leap suggests two things. On the one hand, only via 
the ethical can events in history, such as the political, gain sensibility and unity. 
This idealism presupposes that in itself, the political is devoid of autonomous 
material categories for the construction of its own meaning. On the other, the 
presupposition that the political depends on ethical categories for its sense and 
meaning rather dismisses political agency, i.e. a subjective agency. For what 
constitutes meaning and sense, but also tragedy and disaster, in politics no 
longer comes from real political agents but from the meaning accorded to it by 
the ethics of the good. Imagine a God having no qualms about killing only if it is 
for the good. This provides the basis for non-accountability if not impunity. In a 
slightly inversed situation, Badiou criticized what he called as the “defenders of 
ethical ideology” for having assigned in the ethical category of evil the cause of 
the horrors of the holocaust.76 For Badiou, this position is feeble and cowardly. 
Badiou’s main contention is that the horrors of the holocaust should be 
confronted as what it really was, that is, the consequence of a political, not 
ethical, procedure the categories of which provided the basis for the process of 
extermination.77 Similarly, the procedure of extermination under the current 
                                                        
74 Salvoj Zizek, In Defense of Lost Causes (New York: Verso, 2008), 21. 
75 Abulad, “Martial Law and Religion,” 52. 
76 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward 
(New York: Verso, 2012), 65. 
77 Ibid., 64-65. 
 
 
 
92  R.A. Imbong 
 
 
regime should be glanced and evaluated according to the political categories 
(drug addicts, communists, terrorists, etc.) that it deployed to support its 
regime. 
   
Abulad’s optimism in relation to the Duterte regime is assured by ethics, 
making him conclude that “it might turn out that we have, despite of the scandal 
of killings, a truly ethical and religious president.”78 Abulad was optimistic that 
while the exercise of Martial Law was “desecrated by the Machiavellian hands 
of Marcos,” this time, “it will not be so desecrated by the more realistic hands 
of the still immensely popular Mayor of Davao.”79 Of course, Abulad would not 
associate Machiavelli with Duterte this time because doing so would only 
associate Duterte with Marcos. But more than this avoidance of association is 
the conceptual frame of the ethics of the post-Machiavelli that guided Abulad, 
where he distinguished between politics and management. The former, 
supposedly proper to Marcos, is solely “after the enemy’s head,” while the 
latter, supposedly proper to Duterte, gets “the work or mission done and victory 
achieved” without throwing ethics overboard.80 Of course, with the fluid and 
empty ethics of postmodernism, any ruler could conveniently mobilize to its 
cause the most subversive ethics.  In taking his readers to the heights of the 
ethical and by using the abstract resources of the latter to lend sense and 
meaning to the political, Abulad treaded in controversial waters, where history 
would possibly judge him as someone apologizing for a president who 
instigated crimes against humanity. 
 
While Machiavellian (modernist) politics is brutally honest in the 
exceptional case of a violent political procedure, Abulad’s post-Machiavellian 
(postmodernist) ethics obscures and apologizes senseless violence by way of 
the “good.” Further, while Machiavellian pragmatism is honestly disdainful of 
                                                        
78Abulad, “Martial Law and Religion,” 55. 
79 Ibid., 58. 
80 Abulad, “Philosophy and Politics: Do They Mix?,” 14. 
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the ethical in favor of the political, Abulad’s post-Machiavelli intersects the two 
and laid the support of the latter in the former. Legitimizing a ruthless and 
fascist regime through ethics is not an altogether novel intellectual exercise as 
we have heard similar accounts by Nazi leaders and architects of the holocaust 
such as Heinrich Himmler.81 But Abulad went further by justifying Duterte’s 
regime on the basis of an ethics of the post-Machiavelli, that is, an ethics against 
Ethics. The ethics of post-Machiavelli dismissed the very foundations or 
metanarratives that the modern tradition has handed over. In doing so, post-
Machiavelli provided an ethics that, while critical, is empty of any grounding. 
Such emptiness renders ethics to be a fluid critique of whatever there is. Every 
established norm is subjected to the harshest critique not so much to derive a 
new norm as to perpetually exercise the spirit of critique itself. In this case, the 
means toward the subversion of values become the very end itself. Post-
Machiavelli is a subversive ethics and it could potentially, at least theoretically, 
destroy hitherto existing values. But beyond this subversion is an emptiness 
upon which every moral or political system, including the status quo, could 
derive ideological support.82  
 
A further note, this time concerning Abulad’s method of research. A kind 
of subjectivism pervades all throughout his work Martial Law and Religion. For 
example, Abulad presumed the drug culture that “caused the slow death of our 
country which wastes our youth.”83 Presumed because Abulad presented 
nothing that could support his claim. It is rather alarming that a well-published 
and trusted philosopher failed to support his presumptions with authoritative 
                                                        
81 See for example André Mineau, “Himmler’s Ethics of Duty: A Moral Approach to the 
Holocaust and to Germany’s Impending Defeat,” The European Legacy, 12(1), (2007): 55-73. 
82 One may check for comparison: Terry Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 134. Terry Eagleton, in elaborating the ambivalent 
character of postmodernism, warned that while postmodernism celebrates the contemporary 
inability to “envisage a future for us much different from the present,” there is the possibility 
of a future, among others, that postmodernism’s emptiness could lend ideological support to, 
and its name is fascism. 
83 Abulad, “Martial Law and Religion,” 54. 
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data and reliable facts. Not even the exaggerated numbers of Duterte himself 
was used by Abulad to justify his claim. He could have consulted Nathan Gilbert 
Quimpo who has already shown how the securitization of the drug problem in 
the country was manufactured based on an exaggerated assessment by the 
government itself.84 Another is how Abulad legitimized the Duterte regime by 
invoking the Latin dictum vox populi, vox dei and maintained how the people’s 
voice was reflected in the outcome of an election that “turned out to be reliably 
clean and honest, as well as credible.”85 Not only was the elections marred with 
allegations of fraud and violence, its credibility was also at stake especially in the 
aspect of manipulating voters psychology.86 The fiasco of Cambridge Analytica, 
a political consulting firm that is also linked with Duterte’s presidential 
campaign, only reveals the extent of manipulation during the elections.87 Abulad 
advanced controversial claims without even supporting these with available 
data. Either such data were unbeknownst to the esteemed philosopher, which 
is highly unlikely, or Abulad simply obscured all these to make a consistent 
construction of an ethical Duterte. And the latter seems to be a consistent 
method of Abulad’s ethical leap, where rather than actual and concrete data, 
abstract ethical principles are deployed to give sense and meaning to the 
political. 
 
                                                        
84 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “Duterte’s War on Drugs: The Securitization of Illegal Drugs 
and the return of National Boss Rule,” in A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte’s 
Early Presidency (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2017), 147-151. 
85 Abulad, “Martial Law and Religion,” 54. 
86 Rappler, “Youth Groups Protest Against Perceived Election Irregularities Offline,” 
Rappler, 14 May 2019, retrieved from https://rappler.com/nation/elections/youth-groups-
take-protest-perceived-irregularities-offline. 
87 Raissa Robles, “How Cambridge Analytica’s Parent Company Helped ‘Man of Action’ 
Rodrigo Duterte Win the 2016 Philippines Election,” South China Monitoring Post, 04 April 
2018, retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-
asia/article/2140303/how-cambridge-analyticas-parent-company-helped-man-action; and 
Alex Hern, “Cambridge Analytica: How did it Turn Clicks into Votes?,” The Guardian, 06  May 
2018, retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/may/06/cambridge-
analytica-how-turn-clicks-into-votes-christopher-wylie. 
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Machiavelli Contra Post-Machiavelli and Duterte 
      
The contrast between Machiavelli and Abulad’s post-Machiavelli can be 
traced in the overlapping concepts of necessity, conflict, and the (de)coupling 
of ethics and politics. First, concerning necessity. Unlike Giorgio Agamben who 
theorized the political and legal concept of necessity,88 Machiavelli barely 
touched on it as a theory and rather invoked it in its existential sense. Invoking 
the notion of necessity merely in its existential sense, Machiavelli oftentimes 
associated it with the unexpected socio-political exigencies or accidents. In 
many instances in the Discourses, Machiavelli mentioned about accidents, what 
he recognized as a break from the usual socio-political course. For example, 
Machiavelli discussed how “it will be seen that often things arise and accidents 
come about that the heavens have not altogether wished to be provided 
against.”89 He also noted the unexpected or unforeseeable character of 
accidents cautioning people about their occurrence.90 These accidents could be 
in the form of plagues or famines caused by the unexpected occurrences of the 
natural world or unforeseen events that take place within and rupture the social 
order itself. For Machiavelli, an accident is an occurrence that brings with it the 
potential for a political reorganization that takes the republic back to its point 
of foundation thereby initiating a process of social renewal.91 While an accident 
in politics is something unexpected, its occurrence rather has an instrumental 
quality that, as McCormick explained, if taken advantage of properly could be 
put into good use.92 So, while a regime is put in danger under exceptional 
circumstances, it likewise is placed in an opportunity “for even greater 
                                                        
88 Giorgio Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (California: 
Stanford University Press, 2017), 185-189. 
89 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 197. 
90 Ibid., 231. 
91 Ibid. 
92 McCormick, Addressing the Political Exception: Machiavelli’s ‘Accidents’ and the 
Mixed Regime,” 889. 
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achievements.”93 Machiavelli himself expounded how accidents instrumentally 
perfect the organization of republics. 
      
One could perhaps ask whether Duterte is facing an exceptional moment, 
one that necessitates him to adopt a dictatorial form of rule. To answer in the 
affirmative presupposes that the country today is facing a socio-political 
accident or event and is in a foundational moment. This could mean a potential 
for social renewal and progress for both the republic and the constitution that 
governs it. But what is it that, at least according to Abulad, rather makes the 
situation exceptional? As far as his Martial Law and Religion is concerned, it is the 
supposed drug menace. However, as pointed out, Abulad failed to provide 
authoritative data to support such a claim. Unlike the existential basis for 
Machiavelli’s necessity and the exception that goes along with it, Abulad’s and 
Duterte’s portrayal of the supposed drug menace is based on exaggeration if 
not fabrication. The situation does not warrant an exceptional form of rule for 
the problem that is rather identified is simply ordinary and within the control of 
existing laws and processes. 
      
Second, concerning conflict, one could perhaps ask whether Duterte is 
tolerant of it or not. To answer in the affirmative presupposes a healthy 
democracy where discourse and dialogue, rather than threats, intimidations, 
and killings, characterize social life. This would also mean that Duterte’s regime 
satisfies the criteria of Machiavelli’s mixed regime, sustained by the tension 
between the great (dictator) and the people. But the socio-political situation 
today is far from suggesting that Duterte’s regime is sustained by conflict. 
Rather, Duterte aims at its liquidation. As a matter of fact, the recent enactment 
of the Anti-Terror Law is the epitome of the regime’s intolerance. Such an 
intolerance is obscured in such a way as to portray a category of an enemy (the 
terrorist this time) worthy of being obliterated. And such a liquidationist 
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orientation guided the regime’s conflictual relation with the supposed drug 
users and peddlers. Rather than a rehabilitative and reconciliatory policy 
towards those with whom it potentially has a tension with, the regime 
addresses conflict by obliterating conflict itself, that is, by obliterating those it 
has a conflict with. 
      
Lastly, concerning the coupling of ethics and politics, such is absent in 
Machiavelli’s The Prince and Discourses. Not that an ethics cannot be derived 
from Machivelli’s work. On the contrary, his pragmatism has been a constant 
subject of debate in moral philosophy. What the decoupling of ethics and 
politics rather means is that politics should be regarded as an entirely 
autonomous dimension of human existence, one that takes a life on its own and 
generates for itself its own principles. Hence, politics should be evaluated in 
itself and not by some abstract ethical principles. Evaluating politics in itself 
means engaging it according to the facts that it generates or as Vladimir Lenin 
maintained, the concrete analysis of concrete situations.94 What a coupling of 
the political with the ethical shows, ultimately, is the danger of an ethical 
framing and support of the political. And such a danger could not be more 
pronounced than in an (un)grounded postmodern ethics of the post-
Machiavelli. 
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